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Abstract 
 
In recent years, researchers have used taxation statistics to estimate the share of total 
income held by the richest groups, such as the top 10% or the top 1%. Compiling a 
standardised top income shares dataset for thirteen developed countries, I find that there 
is a strong and significant relationship between top income shares and broader inequality 
measures, such as the gini coefficient. This suggests that panel data on top income shares 
may be a useful substitute for other measures of inequality over periods when alternative 
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  2Since Adam Smith, economists have devoted considerable attention to the causes and 
effects of inequality.
1 Attempting to explain changes in income distribution, economists 
have considered the impact of unionisation, trade, immigration, inflation, family 
structure, the age profile of the population, technological change, compulsory schooling, 
minimum wages and progressive taxation, to name but a few. Inequality has also found 
itself on the right hand side of many regressions. Researchers have investigated whether 
inequality affects growth, consumption, saving, infant mortality, height, residential 
segregation, happiness, trust, crime, and political polarization.
2  
 
However, much of the empirical research on income distribution has been plagued by a 
lack of high-quality data. Inequality measures are sometimes compared to one another 
despite the fact that they differ in their choice of reference group (individual, family, or 
household), in the type of inequality being measured (income or expenditure), in the way 
that income is adjusted for family size, and in whether the estimates take account of 
income taxation. Yet using more comparable estimates of income distribution, such as 
those from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), often means a substantial reduction in 
sample size.  
 
This paper considers an alternative source of data on inequality: measures of the income 
share held by the richest x% of the population, derived from tax return data. In recent 
years, estimates of top income shares for several developed countries have become 
available. Here, I consider the top incomes estimates available for thirteen countries – 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. What issues of 
comparability arise in using these data, as compared with other inequality data? How 
closely do they track the income distribution as a whole? And how might they be used by 
researchers keen to learn more about the causes and effects of inequality? 
 
                                                 
1 Gilbert (1997) has discussed Adam Smith’s writings on poverty and inequality in more detail. 
2 For a good summary of the scope of the field, see Journal of Economic Inequality 1:101–102 (2003).  
  3The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the main data 
quality issues arising from the use of existing inequality datasets and top incomes data. 
Section 2 discusses and analyses the association between top income shares and other 
measures of inequality, and the final section concludes.  
 
1. Data Quality 
 
1.1 Existing inequality datasets 
 
Over the past decade, most researchers studying inequality across countries have used 
one of three datasets: a database constructed by Deininger and Squire (1996), containing 
2632 gini coefficients for 138 countries; the World Income Inequality Database (WIID), 
a more recent database compiled by the United Nations University and the World 
Institute for Development Economics Research, which contains 4664 gini coefficients for 
154 countries; and the LIS, containing 143 measures of inequality for 30 countries.
3  
 
While the Deininger and Squire database and WIID have the advantage of extensive 
coverage across countries and over time, they also have the drawback that their measures 
of inequality are frequently not comparable with one another. In a seminal paper, 
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) noted major problems arising from the use of these 
databases. They observed substantial comparability problems with the database, and 
warned against the practice of researchers merely using the “high quality” subset of the 
database, and the use of dummy variable corrections to account for differences between 
measures of expenditure and income inequality.
4 Atkinson and Brandolini showed that 
certain inter-country and intra-country studies based upon the much-used Deininger and 
                                                 
3 Deininger and Squire dataset downloaded from www.worldbank.org on 20 December 2004. WIID is 
version 2a (July 2005), downloaded from www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. LIS data from 
http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm (file current as of 21 September 2006). In the LIS, there 
are two 1984 observations for France: I use the one from the Household Budget Survey (FR84B). 
4 Deininger and Squire identify a “high quality” subset of their database, consisting of 693 observations 
from 116 countries, which they label “accept”. 
  4Squire (1996) database were not robust to measuring inequality using a different dataset 
that employed a consistent methodology for measuring inequality.
5  
 
For cross-country studies of inequality in developed countries, Atkinson and Brandolini 
advocate making greater use of the LIS, on the basis that it employs a consistent 
methodology across countries for measuring income and calculating inequality. Yet this 
smaller sample size comes at a cost – with 143 observations, the LIS is less than one-
tenth the size of the WIID. Moreover, the LIS has very limited coverage prior to 1980.
6 
These factors limit the scope for careful econometric studies, particularly if one wishes to 
include a country-specific dummy in the regression, or investigate the causes and effects 
of inequality over the very long-run.  
 
1.2 Top incomes 
 
Can top incomes data help fill the void? Beginning with the work by Piketty (2001) on 
the long-run distribution of top incomes in France, top incomes series have now been 
developed for thirteen developed countries. These are Australia (Atkinson and Leigh, 
2007a), Canada (Saez and Veall, 2005), France (Piketty, 2001, 2003, 2007), Germany 
(Dell, 2005, 2007), Ireland (Nolan, 2007), Japan (Moriguchi and Saez, 2006), the 
Netherlands (Salverda and Atkinson 2007), New Zealand (Atkinson and Leigh, 2005), 
Spain (Alvaredo and Saez, 2006), Sweden (Roine and Waldenström, 2006), Switzerland 
(Dell, 2005; Dell, Piketty and Saez, 2007), the United Kingdom (Atkinson, 2005, 2007b) 
and the United States (Piketty and Saez, 2001, 2003). Estimates are also available for the 
world’s three largest developing nations: China (Piketty and Qian, 2006), India (Banerjee 
and Piketty, 2005) and Indonesia (Leigh and van der Eng, 2007). Others are presently 
preparing series for Argentina, Denmark, Finland, Italy, and Norway. 
 
                                                 
5 Greater concern over the quality of inequality measures appears to have penetrated economics to some 
degree, but uncritical use of Deininger and Squire’s dataset remains common in other disciplines. See for 
example Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
6 Although the earliest observation in the LIS is for 1969, only 13 observations appear prior to 1980, so the 
dataset essentially covers the 1980s and 1990s. 
  5Although earlier studies (including the seminal work of Kuznets, 1953, 1955) made use 
of taxation data to measure inequality, much of this prior literature suffered from the 
problem that its estimates were representative only of taxpayers, and not of the entire 
population. What distinguishes the recent literature is the use of external sources to 
produce the population and personal income control totals. Because the recent studies 
take into account the incomes of non-filers, their estimates of top income shares are more 
precise than those that preceded them. 
 
Here, I focus on estimates of top incomes shares that have been prepared for developed 
nations. The main rationale for this exclusion is the greater reliability of taxation statistics 
in this group of countries than in China, India and Indonesia, where tax evasion is a more 
significant problem. Naturally, tax evasion may also affect estimates of top income shares 
in developed nations. For example, Alvaredo and Saez (2006) regard estimates of 
Spanish top incomes prior to 1981 as unreliable due to widespread tax evasion, so I only 
present data for Spain from 1981 onwards. This comparability exercise is designed to 
complement the work of Atkinson and Piketty (2007).
7 Data sources are set out in 
Appendix Table 1.  
 
1.3 Problems of comparability  
 
Deriving income distribution measures from taxation data is not without its 
complications. The most severe of these is that individuals have a strong incentive to 
underreport income to the tax authorities. If the extent of underreporting changes over 
time, then such series may not paint an accurate picture of long-run trends in top income 
shares. Another problem is that the income unit is either the individual or the tax filing 
unit, rather than the measure of income that is typically of most interest to economists: 
family or household income, equivalized for household size. 
 
The issue of comparability of top incomes estimates across countries is dealt with in 
some detail in Atkinson (2007a) and Atkinson and Leigh (2007b). The particular focus 
                                                 
7 On the construction of compatible top incomes series, see also Piketty and Saez (2006a). 
  6here is on issues of comparability that affect the use of top incomes series as a panel 
dataset, and on appropriate corrections to be made. I therefore focus on seven issues: the 
start date for the tax year, the appropriate cut-off for the adult population, the definition 
of the income unit, the construction of the personal income total, the definition of taxable 
versus total income in taxation statistics, the inclusion of capital gains, and interpolation 
of data in missing years.
8 
 
1.  The tax year. In Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United States, the tax year and calendar year are one and the 
same. However, this is not true of all countries. The tax year commences on July 
1 in Australia, April 1 in New Zealand, and April 6 in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. In order to construct a panel dataset of top incomes, which might be 
matched to data collected on a calendar-year basis, I create a dataset in which top 
income shares are averaged across tax years for these countries. In referring to tax 
changes in this paper, any reference to a tax year should be taken to refer to the 
start of the tax year – for example, the 1980 Australian tax year is the tax year 
starting on July 1, 1980.  
 
2.  The appropriate age cut-off for the adult population. The estimates for 
Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom use persons 
aged 15 and over, the estimates for Sweden use persons aged 16 and over, the 
estimates for Ireland use persons aged 18 and over, while those for Canada, 
France, Japan, Spain, Switzerland and the United States use persons aged 20 and 
over. To give some sense of the magnitude of the effect, Atkinson and Leigh 
(2005, 2007a) find for Australia and New Zealand that shifting from a population 
control total of 15 and over to one of persons aged 20 and over reduces the top 
1%  share by approximately 0.5 percentage points, and the top 10% share by 
approximately 2 percentage points. They do not discern any substantial change in 
                                                 
8 For brevity, I do not deal with two other issues. On the treatment of part-year units, see Atkinson and 
Salverda (2003). On the use of the Pareto extrapolation method to estimate the share of top income groups 
where the share of the population in the top income band is larger than the share to be estimated, see 
Atkinson (2007a). 
  7this effect over time (see also Roine and Waldenström 2006, who show a similar 
robustness check for Sweden). I do not make any adjustment for this, though an 
argument could be made for doing so. 
 
3.  The income unit. In Australia, Canada and Spain, the tax unit is the individual. In 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States, the tax unit is 
a married couple or single individuals, and the population control total is therefore 
the adult population minus the number of married females. Germany has a hybrid 
system, with most taxpayers filing as tax units, and the very rich filing as 
individuals. In 1948, the United States changed the incentives for married women 
to file separately, so Piketty and Saez adjust the income shares by “about 2.5%” 
for the period 1913-1947 (Piketty and Saez, 2001, 35n). A more significant shift 
occurred in Japan (1950), New Zealand (1953), Sweden (1971) and in the United 
Kingdom (1990), when the tax unit switched from the household to the individual. 
In the case of Japan, Moriguchi and Saez (2006) are able to subtract dependent 
income from head-of-household income for earlier years. For Sweden, Roine and 
Waldenström (2006) find little impact of this shift, so do not adjust their series. 
For New Zealand and the United Kingdom, such a correction is not possible, and 
the effect of the switch appears to have been to substantially increase top income 
shares in both countries. Atkinson and Leigh (2005) therefore adjust the New 
Zealand series, assuming that the whole of the increase in the top shares from 
1952 to 1953 represented the effect of the move from a tax unit to an individual 
basis, and apply this constant adjustment to 1952 and all previous years. 
Similarly, I assume that the United Kingdom increase in top income shares from 
1989 to 1990 also represented the effect of the move from a tax unit to an 
individual basis, and apply this constant adjustment to the years 1908-1989. 
(Since UK top income shares were steadily rising in the 1980s and 1990s, 
attributing all of the change from 1989 to 1990 to the shift in the tax unit probably 
underestimates the true increase in top income shares.) 
 
  84.  The personal income total. The appropriate income control total used to derive 
the top income shares in each country is the sum that would have been reported 
were all adults to have paid tax. This figure is typically derived by starting with 
the national accounts and subtracting the income of the government sector, 
corporate sector, and non-profit sector.
9 While the accuracy of the personal 
income control total will doubtless vary from country to country (depending 
largely on the quality of the national accounts), there do not appear to be 
systematic differences between nations.
10 
 
5.  Income definition – taxable and total income. In the earlier years, taxation 
statistics for several countries were tabulated by assessable income (income less 
deductions). In later years, this shifted to total income. In the case of Australia, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, this change has been accounted for in the 
production of the top incomes series. Another issue is that certain types of income 
are not included in taxation statistics. In the case of the United States, Piketty and 
Saez (2001) note that non-taxable (and partially taxable) social security benefits 
grew as a share of personal income during the post-war decades, but find that 
these changes had only a trivial impact on top income shares. However, 
differences in the definition of taxable income may have a greater impact when 
comparing top income shares across countries. 
 
6.  Income definition – inclusion and exclusion of realised capital gains. For the 
purposes of the analysis in this paper, I present series that exclude capital gains 
wherever possible. For Australia, Ireland and New Zealand, series excluding 
capital gains are not readily available, so series for these countries include 
realised capital gains, to the extent that such gains were taxable.  
 
                                                 
9 Personal income in the national accounts is typically constructed from a variety of sources, including 
surveys and data on wage bills. However, as Nolan (2007) points out, in some instances total taxable 
income may itself be used in the construction of the national accounts personal income figure. 
10 The personal income control total is about two-thirds of GDP. This ratio appears quite similar across 
countries, and shows no systematic trends, either upwards or downwards.  
  97.  Interpolation for missing years. In several instances, taxation statistics are 
unavailable. For example, income taxation statistics for New Zealand are 
available for 1921-2002, but were not compiled during the Depression (1931-32), 
World War II (1941-44), and a few later years (1961, 1974 and 1976). Where the 
gap is four years or less, I linearly interpolate for the missing years. However, in 
some cases, the gap is larger than four years. For example, the share of the richest 
10% in the United Kingdom is missing from 1920-36, and in such instances, I do 
not interpolate. In the case of Switzerland, taxpayers are only required to file 
returns every two years, so I assign the same figure to both years. During the 
period 1887-1898, Japanese tax returns were for overlapping three years periods, 
so I assign the top income estimate to the middle year.
11 And for France, top 
income shares for 1900-1910 are based on average data for the period, so I assign 
the number to 1905.  
 
Appendix Table 2 presents summary statistics, and Appendix Table 3 shows correlations 
between the inequality measures. Figures 1 and 2 depict the top 10% share for Anglo-
Saxon and non Anglo-Saxon countries; while figures 3 and 4 show the top 1% share for 
these two sets of countries (note that the top 10% share is unavailable for Japan). In all 
countries except Switzerland, top income shares tended to fall from the 1920s to the 
1970s. Since the 1970s, top income shares in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) have risen 
sharply, while shares in Japan and in the continental European countries (France, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) remained relatively stable. 
 
Across the thirteen countries, using the adjusted and interpolated series, there are a total 
of 761 observations for the share of the richest 10%, and 937 observations for the share 
of the richest 1%. This is more than five times as many observations as in the LIS, and 
                                                 
11 As Moriguchi and Saez (2006) point out, the effect of tax averaging over multiple years is probably also 
to reduce top income shares. Neither they nor I make any adjustment for this. 
  10exceeds the number of high-quality country-year observations in both the Deininger and 



























                                                 
12 Deininger and Squire identify 693 observations which they label “accept”. Version 2a of the WIID 
contains 1223 observations classified as Quality=1, but many of these are repeated observations for the 






















Fig 2: Income Share of Richest 10%






































Fig 4: Income Share of Richest 1%
in Non Anglo-Saxon Countries
 
 
2. Comparison With Other Inequality Measures 
 
While top income shares are available over a long time horizon, are they a useful measure 
of inequality in a society? Measured against the axioms of inequality set out in Cowell 
(1995), top income shares satisfy three basic principles: income scale independence, 
principle of population, and anonymity.
13 However, top income shares only weakly 
satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, since a transfer from rich to poor will never 
increase the top income shares, but if the transfer is between two individuals who are 
both within the top group or both outside the top group, then the share measure will 
remain unchanged. (Top income shares are also not decomposable into within-group 
inequality and between-group inequality.) Another issue is that top income shares are 
based on pre-tax incomes. To the extent that the redistributive effect of taxation differs 
                                                 
13 Income scale independence requires that the inequality measure be unaffected by proportional changes in 
income (eg. expressing income in pence rather than pounds should not change inequality). The principle of 
population requires that the inequality measure be unaffected by replications of the population (eg. merging 
two identical distributions should not change inequality). Anonymity requires that the inequality measure 
be unaffected by characteristics apart from income.  
  13across countries and over time, top income shares may be a poor proxy for the differences 
in spending power in a given society.  
 
Nonetheless, if the taxation system does not change, then a shock to the income 
distribution (eg. skill-biased technological change) may affect both the bottom and top of 
the distribution. In this event, it may be the case that the share of income held by the top 
10% is a usable proxy for inequality across the distribution. One way to test whether top 
income shares are a good proxy for inequality across the distribution is to empirically 
analyse the relationship between top incomes measures and income inequality in the 
recent era (when both are available). In this section, I first compare top income shares 
with gini coefficients from the WIID (since the Deininger and Squire database is fully 
contained within the WIID, I do not separately analyse that dataset), and then compare 
top income shares with income measures from the LIS.  
 
In order to analyse the relationship between top income shares and gini coefficient in the 
WIID, I use observations from the WIID that meet four criteria: (a) the estimate was for 
income rather than consumption or expenditure; (b) the income-sharing unit was the 
family or household; (c) the estimate covered the full geographic area of the country; (d) 
the estimate covered the entire population. Where there were multiple observations that 
met these standards, I used the observation given the highest quality rating by the WIID.  
 
To see the relationship between top income shares and other measure of inequality, I 
simply regress one upon the other. In principle, it does not matter which is the dependent 
variable, but here I use the top income share as the dependent variable, since it then 
becomes straightforward to extend the model to estimate specifications with more than 
one inequality measure on the right hand side of the equation.  
 
The estimating equations take the following form: 
 
Log(S)jt = α + βLog(Ineq measure)jt + εjt       ( 1 )  
Log(S)jt = α + βLog(Ineq measure)jt + γj + εjt       ( 2 )  
  14Log(S)jt = α + βLog(Ineq measure)jt + γj + δt + εjt      ( 3 )  
 
Where S is a measure of top income (such as the income share of the top 10%) in country 
j in year t, and “Ineq measure” is some alternative measure of inequality. Equation (2) 
also includes a country-specific term, γ. Equation (3) is a standard panel data 
specification, including both country fixed effects and year fixed effects, δ.  
 
Table 1 shows the results of this estimation. In Panel A, I estimate the relationship 
between the top 10% share and the WIID gini coefficient: without fixed effects; with 
country fixed effects; and with country and year fixed effects. The two series are 
positively associated with one another, with the relationship being significant at the 1% 
level. In Panel B, I use the top 1% share as the dependent variable, and again find a 
positive and statistically significant relationship with the WIID gini coefficient.  
 
 
Table 1: Top Incomes and WIID Inequality Measures 
Panel A: Dependent variable is Ln(Top 10% Share) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Ln(Gini) 0.304***  0.229***  0.219*** 
 [0.045]  [0.042]  [0.038] 
Country FE  No  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  No  No  Yes 
Observations 263  263  263 
R-squared 0.20  0.76  0.89 
Panel B: Dependent variable is Ln(Top 1% Share) 
Ln(Gini) 0.799***  0.693***  0.422*** 
 [0.086]  [0.100]  [0.070] 
Country FE  No  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  No  No  Yes 
Observations 300  300  300 
R-squared 0.29  0.67  0.89 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
 
Next, I investigate the relationship between top incomes measures and the LIS. These 
measures of inequality are derived by the LIS team from national survey microdata, and 
are standardised according to the following five rules: (a) the income measure is 
disposable income; (b) income is pooled within households and divided by the square 
  15root of the number of people in the family; (c) all individuals, including children, are 
weighted according to their representation in the population; (d) income is bottom-coded 
at 1% of equivalized mean income, and top-coded at 10 times mean income; and (e) 
missing and zero incomes are excluded.
14 The LIS provides a number of inequality 
measures. Here, I use the gini, the Atkinson index (with an inequality aversion parameter 
of 1), the 90:10 ratio, the 90:50 ratio, and the 50:10 ratio. Since Japan and New Zealand 
are not included in the LIS, the regressions below cover only eleven countries. 
 
Table 2 shows the results from this exercise. Without country and year fixed effects 
(Panel A), the top 10% share is positively related to each of the other inequality 
measures, with the relationship being statistically significant at the 1% level. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the 50:10 ratio is significantly related to the top 10% share, and this 
relationship remains significant even holding constant the 90:50 ratio. Results including 
country fixed effects (Panel B) are similar to those without country fixed effects, except 
that the relationship between the 50:10 and the top 10% share is insignificant once the 
90:50 ratio is included in the regression.  
 
Panel C includes both country and year fixed effects, allowing for country-specific 
differences in the relationship between the inequality measures, as well as for non-linear 
time variation. In this specification, the gini, Atkinson index, and 90:50 ratio are each 
positively and significantly associated with the share of the richest 10%, while the 50:10 
ratio is negatively and significantly related to the share of the richest 10%. Again, when 
both the 90:50 and the 50:10 ratios are included in the regression, only the 90:50 ratio is 
statistically significant.  
 
                                                 
14 For more detail on the methodology used to construct the LIS inequality measures, see 
http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/methods.htm. 
  16 
Table 2: Top Incomes and LIS Inequality Measures 
Dependent variable: Ln(Top 10% Share) 
Panel A: Without Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Gini)  0.824***      
  [0.072]       
Ln(Atkinson Index ε=1.0)    0.391***     
   [0.058]        
Ln(90:10)     0.513***    
     [0.060]      
Ln(90:50)      1.203***    0.874***
      [0.135]    [0.178] 
Ln(50:10)       0.662*** 0.311***
       [0.101]  [0.098] 
Observations  63 63 63 63 63 63 
R-squared  0.56 0.42 0.52  0.5  0.39 0.55 
Panel B: With Country Fixed Effects 
Ln(Gini)  0.881***      
  [0.098]       
Ln(Atkinson Index ε=1.0)    0.306***     
   [0.060]        
Ln(90:10)     0.534***    
     [0.113]      
Ln(90:50)      1.126***    1.082***
      [0.182]    [0.184] 
Ln(50:10)       0.339**  0.178 
       [0.154]  [0.147] 
Observations  63 63 63 63 63 63 
R-squared  0.91 0.86 0.85 0.88  0.8  0.89 
Panel C: With Country and Year Fixed Effects 
Ln(Gini)  0.445**       
  [0.171]       
Ln(Atkinson Index ε=1.0)  0.140*        
   [0.080]        
Ln(90:10)     0.137      
     [0.171]      
Ln(90:50)      0.707***    0.674***
      [0.215]    [0.239] 
Ln(50:10)       -0.227*  -0.123 
       [0.133]  [0.135] 
Observations  63 63 63 63 63 63 
R-squared  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
 
  17Table 3 replicates the exercise, using the top 1% share as the dependent variable. The 
results are similar to those in the previous table, with each of the inequality measures 
being positively and significantly related to the income share of the richest 1% (Panel A). 
This remains true (with the exception of the 50:10 ratio) when country fixed effects are 
added to the regression (Panel B). Including country and year fixed effects (Panel C), the 
coefficients are mostly positive, but only statistically significant for the 90:50 ratio 
(which is positively related to the share of the richest 1%), and the 50:10 ratio (which is 
negatively related to the share of the richest 1%). 
 
  18 
Table 3: Top Incomes and LIS Inequality Measures 
Dependent variable: Ln(Top 1% Share) 
Panel A: Without Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln(Gini)  1.495***      
  [0.203]       
Ln(Atkinson Index ε=1.0)    0.688***     
   [0.142]        
Ln(90:10)     0.882***    
     [0.154]      
Ln(90:50)      2.155***    1.714***
      [0.346]    [0.415] 
Ln(50:10)       1.106*** 0.418* 
       [0.248]  [0.250] 
Observations  63 63 63 63 63 63 
R-squared  0.44 0.31 0.37 0.38 0.27 0.41 
Panel B: With Country Fixed Effects 
Ln(Gini)  1.919***      
  [0.298]       
Ln(Atkinson Index ε=1.0)    0.615***     
   [0.157]        
Ln(90:10)     1.017***    
     [0.292]      
Ln(90:50)      2.407***    2.373***
      [0.497]    [0.554] 
Ln(50:10)       0.489  0.137 
       [0.370]  [0.456] 
Observations  63 63 63 63 63 63 
R-squared  0.83 0.76 0.75  0.8  0.7  0.8 
Panel C: With Country and Year Fixed Effects 
Ln(Gini)  0.797       
  [0.602]       
Ln(Atkinson Index ε=1.0)   0.165        
   [0.262]        
Ln(90:10)     0.178      
     [0.474]      
Ln(90:50)      1.483*    1.373 
      [0.786]    [0.843] 
Ln(50:10)       -0.614*  -0.401 
       [0.355]  [0.439] 
Observations  63 63 63 63 63 63 
R-squared  0.96 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.97 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
 
  19Using inequality data from either the WIID or the LIS, it appears that the relationship 
between top income shares and other inequality measures remains strong even when 
country fixed effects are included. This suggests that within-country changes in top 
income shares can be a useful proxy for changes in other inequality measures. Indeed, the 
relationship between the top 10% share and several other inequality measures remains 




The careful creation of top incomes series over recent years provides a window into the 
long-run distribution of incomes in an (increasing) number of nations. But using these 
data as a long panel requires careful attention to the various differences between them. 
This paper highlights the main disparities between the series, and where possible, makes 
adjustments to account for these. Such data will not be perfectly comparable, but such is 
the nature of many of the existing datasets used to measure the causes and effects of 
inequality across countries. 
 
The other question that this paper has sought to answer is whether top incomes series are 
a useful proxy for inequality across the income distribution. On a theoretical level, this 
seems plausible, since many of the factors that affect inequality are likely to have an 
impact on both the top and bottom of the distribution. Comparing measures of inequality 
based on top income shares with measures of household or family inequality from the 
WIID and LIS, I find a strong positive relationship between the series, which is robust to 
the inclusion of country and year fixed effects. This should be reassuring for potential 
users of top income shares as a proxy for inequality across the distribution, since the 
inclusion of country and year fixed effects is standard in cross-country panel data 
analysis. In summary, top income shares are far from perfect as a measure the distribution 
of income across society. But where other data sources are limited, they may help to fill 
in some of the gaps. 
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Appendix Table 1: Sources and Adjustments 
Country Source  Adjustments  Years  Covered 
(Adjusted Series) 
Australia Atkinson  and  Leigh 
(2007a, Table 1) 
Converted to calendar year basis.  1922-2003 
Canada  Saez and Veall (2005, 
Excel Table B1) 
No adjustments made.  1920-2000 
France Piketty  (2007,  Table 
13.1) 
Top income shares for 1900-1910 are based 
on average data for the period, so this 
number is assigned to 1905. 
1905-1998 
Germany  Dell (2007, Table 
13.7) 
No adjustments made.  1925-1998 
Ireland   Nolan (2007, Table 
13.10) 
Converted to calendar year basis.   1939-2000 
Japan  Moriguchi and Saez 
(2006, Table A1) 
No adjustments made. No top 10% series 
available. 
1886-2002 
Netherlands   Salverda and 
Atkinson (2007, 
Table 13.8) 
No adjustments made.  1914-1999 
New Zealand  Atkinson and Leigh 
(2005, Tables 1 and 
3) 
Adjusted 1% series taken from Table 3. 
Unadjusted 10% series taken from Table 1 
and adjusted in a similar manner. Both 
series then converted to calendar year basis. 
1922-2002 
Spain Alvaredo  and  Saez 
(2006, Table B2) 
No adjustments made  1981-2002 
Sweden   Roine and 
Waldenström (2006, 
Excel Table A2) 
No adjustments made.   1903-2004 
Switzerland   Dell, Piketty and Saez 
(2007, Table 13.9) 
Taxpayers are only required to file returns 
every two years, so I assign the same figure 






In 1908-1989, 10% share multiplied by 
1.081 and 1% share multiplied by 1.130, to 
take account of the shift from joint to 
individual filing in 1990. Converted to 
calendar year basis. 
1919-2000 
United States   Piketty and Saez 
(2006b, Excel Table 
A1) 
No adjustments made.  1913-2004 
Note: For all countries, top income shares in missing years are linearly interpolated, so long as the gap is 
four years or less. 
 
  24 
Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  SD Min  Max 
Top 10% share  761 34.103  5.556 21.700 53.310 
Top 1% share  937  10.634 4.258 3.570  28.040 
Gini (WIID)  300 33.171  6.816 19.100 54.300 
Gini (LIS)  63 29.317  3.872 19.700 37.200 
Atkinson Index 
ε=1.0 (LIS)  63  15.348 3.683 7.300  22.900 
90:10 (LIS)  63 3.886 0.828 2.430 5.850 
50:10 (LIS)  63 2.052 0.302 1.581 2.799 
90:50 (LIS)  63 1.878 0.163 1.510 2.230 
















90:10 50:10 90:50 
Top 10%   1.000         
Top 1%   0.897  1.000        
Gini (WIID)  0.370  0.486  1.000       
Gini (LIS)  0.726 0.631 0.684 1.000         
Atkinson   0.622 0.541 0.714 0.934 1.000       
90:10   0.698 0.592 0.648 0.912 0.872 1.000     
50:10   0.627 0.519 0.585 0.773 0.768 0.953 1.000   
90:50   0.674 0.569 0.618 0.952 0.851 0.837 0.637 1.000 
Note: All correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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